Content Credentials & Digital Provenance
C2PA Viewer & Provenance Inspector
Inspect images for embedded Content Credentials (C2PA). Check if a photo was captured by a certified digital camera (Leica, Sony, Nikon), edited in Photoshop, or generated by an AI model (DALL·E, Midjourney, Firefly) — completely private on your device.
Drag and drop an image to inspect Content Credentials
Inspects image headers for C2PA JUMBF manifests, caBX chunks, and provenance declarations. Supports JPEG, PNG, and WebP up to 25 MB.
Container Architecture
Inside a C2PA Content Credentials Package
How verifiable provenance manifests and cryptographic assertions are structured inside standard image files:
Credentials Envelope
Stores provenance data safely inside standard JPEG (APP11), PNG (caBX), or WebP images without altering visual quality.
Origin & Sensor Record
Documents whether the photo came from a certified camera hardware sensor or was synthesized by an AI generative model.
Edit & Inpainting History
Maintains an immutable chain of modifications applied to the asset, such as cropping, color grading, or AI object replacements.
Digital Tamper Seal
A cryptographic signature that binds assertions to the uncompressed pixel array. Any altered pixel breaks the seal.
Hardware Camera vs. Generative AI Trust Matrix
The C2PA standard operates as a cryptographic transparency ledger that records verifiable origin assertions rather than simple binary labels:
Physical Sensor Capture
Cameras with built-in hardware security chips (HSM) calculate a SHA-256 pixel hash at shutter click and sign it with factory root certificates.
Model Synthesis Engines
Compliant generative platforms embed C2PA claims declaring that pixels were synthesized, attaching the model identifier and prompt metadata.
Transcoded Web Media
Social networks recompress images on upload to save bandwidth. This removes the provenance container without indicating whether the image is real or AI.
Hard Binding (Pixel Hashes) vs. Soft Binding (Watermarks)
A common misconception is that C2PA credentials are "watermarks". In reality, C2PA uses Hard Binding: the manifest contains cryptographic hashes of the exact uncompressed pixel array. If a user crops the image by 1 pixel, compresses it with higher JPEG loss, or takes a screenshot, the pixel hash calculation changes, and the cryptographic signature becomes invalid.
To survive social media recompression, future revisions of the C2PA specification are introducing Soft Binding — pairing the cryptographic manifest with imperceptible neural audio/visual watermarks (such as Google SynthID) that persist even after container metadata has been stripped.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a C2PA manifest in a digital image?
A C2PA manifest is a cryptographically signed data package embedded inside an image container (like JPEG, PNG, or WebP). Standardized by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, it binds details about the device, editing software, and generative AI tools to the exact image pixels using public-key cryptography.
Does the absence of a C2PA marker mean an image is fake or AI-generated?
No. The vast majority of images on the internet do not currently contain C2PA credentials. Major social media platforms (including Twitter/X, Instagram, and WhatsApp) automatically strip metadata during compression to reduce bandwidth and protect user privacy.
Can an attacker forge or tamper with a C2PA Content Credential?
An attacker cannot forge a valid signature without the private key of an authorized certificate authority (like Leica, Sony, Adobe, or OpenAI). However, an attacker can easily strip the C2PA credentials entirely or take a screenshot of a signed image, producing an unsigned copy.
How does C2PA differentiate camera photos from generative AI?
C2PA manifests contain assertion objects. Hardware cameras (like Leica M11-P or Sony Alpha) record hardware signing assertions with device serial numbers, while generative platforms (like Adobe Firefly or DALL·E 3) explicitly declare 'c2pa.actions' indicating synthetic media creation.